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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
___________ 
 
Nos. 93-7809 & 94-7000 
___________ 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
     Appellant at No. 94-7000 
 
    v. 
 
MICHAEL M. SCHEIN, 
     Appellant at No. 93-7809 
 
___________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 93-cr-00097) 
  
___________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 24, 1994 
 
 
PRESENT:  BECKER and HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judges, 
and PADOVA, District Judge* 
 
 
(Filed July 29, 1994) 
____________ 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Michael M. Schein 
253 North Hartley 
York, PA     17404 
  Pro Se Appellant in No. 93-7089 
               Pro Se Appelee in No. 94-7000 
 
 
 
 
_______________ 
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*  Hon. John R. Padova, United States District Judge for the 
   Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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David M. Barasch, Esquire 
  United States Attorney 
Dennis C. Pfannenschmidt, Esquire 
  Assistant United States Attorney 
Office of United States Attorney 
Federal Building 
228 Walnut Street 
P.O. Box 11754 
Harrisburg, PA     17108 
  Attorneys for United States of America 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
 
HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Appellant, Michael Schein ("Schein"), appeals a final 
judgment of conviction on obscenity charges entered against him 
by the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania.  The government cross-appeals from the district 
court's decision to depart downward from the Sentencing 
Guidelines and place Schein on probation.  We will affirm 
Schein's conviction but vacate the sentence of probation because 
the district court did not give its reasons for departing 
downward.  Accordingly, we will remand the case to the district 
court to give it an opportunity to make findings in support of 
its downward departure or, in the absence of evidence to support 
such findings, to resentence Schein within the applicable 
guideline range. 
 Schein was indicted by a federal grand jury on eight 
counts, five for mailing obscene materials (Counts One through 
Five), one for making false declarations (Count Six), and two for 
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criminal forfeiture (Counts Seven and Eight).  After Schein 
waived his right to a jury, the district court held a bench trial 
and found him guilty of Counts One through Five, not guilty of 
Count Six and disposed of Counts Seven and Eight charging 
forfeiture on the basis of a stipulation. 
 At trial the government presented five tapes it had 
ordered from Schein's mail order catalog.  The tapes contain 
graphic depictions of urination, masturbation, and oral and anal 
sex among homosexual males.  The district court found these tapes 
were obscene and thus determined appellant was guilty of mailing 
obscene material in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1461 (West 1984). 
Departing downward, the court sentenced Schein to twelve months 
probation. 
 In his appeal Schein argues the district court wrongly 
concluded his videotapes were obscene.1  On cross-appeal the 
government argues the court's downward departure from the 
applicable Sentencing Guidelines range of eighteen to twenty-four 
months, to a sentence of twelve months probation, is not in 
accord with law. 
 We first consider Schein's appeal from his conviction. 
Obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment. Whether 
material is obscene is judged under the three part Miller test.  
                     
1Appellant also argues the firearms the government seized from 
him should be returned.  This issue was not presented to the 
district court, and therefore it is not properly raised on 
appeal.  Nevertheless, we note that the government has agreed to 
have a licensed federal firearms dealer sell the weapons and have 
the proceeds distributed to Schein. 
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See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).  This test requires 
us to determine: 
(a) whether "the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards" would find 
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to 
the prurient interest[]; (b) whether the work 
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive 
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by 
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the 
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political or scientific 
value. 
 
 
Id. at 24 (citation omitted).  In deciding whether the evidence 
was sufficient to find Schein guilty of mailing obscene material, 
we must consider whether there is substantial evidence, viewing 
the record in a light most favorable to the government, to 
support the factfinder's verdict of guilty.  Government of the 
Virgin Islands v. Williams, 739 F.2d 936, 940 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 Schein claims the tapes are not obscene because 
photographs of "urolagnic" pornography by Robert Mapplethorpe 
were shown at an exhibit funded by the government's National 
Endowment of the Arts.  We reject this argument.  Schein is not 
Mapplethorpe and it is plain that Schein's tapes lack serious 
artistic value, whatever artistic merit Mapplethorpe's work may 
have.  Moreover, mere availability of similar material is not a 
defense to obscenity.  Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 126 
(1974) ("'Mere availability of similar material by itself means 
nothing more than that other persons are engaged in similar 
activity.'")  (quoting, United States v. Manarite, 448 F.2d 583, 
593 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
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 Schein next claims his videotapes come within part (c) 
of the Miller test excluding certain expressive materials from 
the class of those that are obscene because Schein's tapes 
promote sexual safety and therefore serve an important social 
interest.  We agree with Schein that materials which promote 
public health are not obscene just because they graphically 
depict human sexual or excretory acts.  Nevertheless, this 
argument also fails. 
The proper inquiry is not whether an ordinary 
member of any given community would find 
serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value in allegedly obscene 
material, but whether a reasonable person 
would find such value in the material, taken 
as a whole. 
 
 
Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987) (footnote omitted). 
Considering Schein's videotapes in their totality, we conclude 
that the district court did not err in deciding they served no 
serious public purpose.  As noted in Miller, "'[a] quotation from 
Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will not constitutionally 
redeem an otherwise obscene publication.'"  Miller, 413 U.S. at 
25 n.7 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin 408 U.S. 229, 231 (1972)). 
Schein's videotapes are not redeemed because the participants in 
the homosexual acts he depicts wear condoms and the viewers are 
reminded, from time to time, to have "safe sex." 
 Finally, Schein argues he is not guilty because he took 
measures to make sure his videos were sold only to consenting 
adults, and therefore neither the "average person" nor the 
"community" were exposed.  Accordingly, he contends it is wrong 
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to judge his work under Miller's "average person" or "community 
standards" test for obscenity.  The taking of precautionary 
measures to make sure obscene materials are distributed only to 
consenting adults is not a defense to distribution of obscene 
material.  Obscene materials are not immune because only 
consenting adults see them.  Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 
U.S. 49, 57 (1973).  Schein claims that Paris is distinguishable 
because an adult movie theater has more impact than the viewing 
of videotapes in the privacy of one's home.  We do not believe 
this distinction is material.  The law prohibits use of the mails 
to distribute obscene material, and the Supreme Court has decided 
obscene material is no less obscene because it is viewed only by 
consenting adults.  "We categorically disapprove the theory . . . 
that obscene, pornographic films acquire constitutional immunity 
from state regulation simply because they are exhibited for 
consenting adults only."  Id.  Moreover, it would be impossible 
for Schein or any other purveyor of obscene materials to provide 
any real assurance that the persons ordering the obscene 
materials were all consenting adults who would restrict their 
viewing to themselves or their families in a private setting. 
 In its cross-appeal the government contends the 
district court erred in departing downward from the Guidelines 
sentence.  The district court's power to depart downward is a 
legal question subject to plenary review.  United States v. 
Higgins, 967 F.2d 841, 844 (3d Cir. 1992).  Whether a departure 
was based on incorrect factual findings, however, is judged under 
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the clearly erroneous standard.  United States v. Shoupe, 929 
F.2d 116, 119 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 382 (1991). 
 Here the sentencing court departed downward from the 
guideline range of eighteen to twenty-four months incarceration 
to twelve months probation.  It concluded, "the sentence required 
by the guidelines overstates the seriousness of the offense 
committed by the defendant in this case, particularly as he is a 
first offender . . . ."  Appendix at 112.  This conclusory 
statement is not adequate for us to determine whether Schein 
meets any of the guideline requirements for downward departure. 
 [T]he Sentencing Reform Act requires a 
sentencing court to impose a sentence within 
the range prescribed by the Guidelines 
"unless the court finds that there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a 
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken 
into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the guideline that 
should result in a sentence different from 
that described."  18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b). 
"This provision is mandatory." 
 
 
Shoupe, 929 F.2d at 119 (quoting United States v. Uca, 867 F.2d 
783, 786 (3d Cir. 1989)).  Moreover, there is no provision in the 
Sentencing Reform Act or the Guidelines that provides for a 
downward departure because Guidelines overstates the seriousness 
of the offense, (in contrast, e.g., to overstatement of the 
seriousness of the defendant's criminal record).  Under U.S.S.G. 
§ 5H1.4, however, "an extraordinary physical impairment may be a 
reason to impose a sentence below the applicable guideline range 
. . . ."  Schein, an avowed homosexual, has tested HIV positive, 
and he may have a related serious physical complication.  Thus, 
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there may be a reason to grant a downward departure in his case. 
The district court, however, has not made any findings on the 
extent to which Schein suffers from physical impairment.  
Therefore, there is no basis in the present record on which this 
Court could decide that any mitigating circumstances relating to 
Schein's health exist that would justify the district court's 
downward departure.  Accordingly, we must vacate the sentence of 
the district court and remand this case for further appropriate 
findings or, in their absence, resentencing within the 
Guidelines. 
 We will affirm Schein's conviction, but, on the 
government's cross-appeal, we will vacate his sentence and remand 
to the district court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
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